















Precautionary Savings  
by Natives and Immigrants in Germany 
SOEPpapers 
on Multidisciplinary 
Panel Data Research 
Berlin, August 2007 SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research at DIW Berlin 
 
This series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable 
data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary 
household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, 
sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational 
science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and 
sport science.   
 
The decision to publish a submission in SOEPpapers is made by a board of editors chosen 
by the DIW Berlin to represent the wide range of disciplines covered by SOEP. There is no 
external referee process and papers are either accepted or rejected without revision. Papers 
appear in this series as works in progress and may also appear elsewhere. They often 
represent preliminary studies and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a 
paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be requested from 
the author directly. 
 
Any opinions expressed in this series are those of the author(s) and not those of DIW Berlin. 
Research disseminated by DIW Berlin may include views on public policy issues, but the 
institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 




Georg Meran (Vice President DIW Berlin) 
Gert G. Wagner (Social Sciences) 
Joachim R. Frick (Empirical Economics) 
Jürgen Schupp (Sociology) 
Conchita D’Ambrosio (Welfare Economics)  
Christoph Breuer (Sport Science, DIW Research Professor)  
Anita I. Drever (Geography) 
Frieder R. Lang (Psychology, DIW Research Professor) 
Jörg-Peter Schräpler (Survey Methodology) 
C. Katharina Spieß (Educational Science) 
Martin Spieß (Statistical Modelling) 
Viktor Steiner (Public Economics, Department Head DIW Berlin) 




German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) 
DIW Berlin 
Mohrenstrasse 58 
10117 Berlin, Germany 
Contact: Uta Rahmann  |  urahmann@diw.de    1
Precautionary Savings by Natives and Immigrants in Germany 
 
Matloob Piracha 
University of Kent and IZA, Bonn 
 
Yu Zhu 






This paper analyses the savings behaviour of natives and immigrants in Germany. 
It is argued that uncertainty about future income and legal status (in case of immigrants) 
is a key component in the determination of the level of precautionary savings. Using the 
German Socio-economic Panel data it is shown that, although immigrants have lower 
levels of savings and are less likely to have regular savings than natives, the gap is 
significantly narrowed once we take loan repayments and remittances into account. 
Moreover, we find that marginal propensity to save for immigrants is about 40% higher 
than that for natives. 
We then exploit a natural experiment arising from a change in nationality law in 
Germany in 2000 to estimate the importance of precautionary savings. Using a 
difference-in-differences approach, we find that the easing of the requirements for 
naturalization has caused significant reductions of savings and remittances for 
immigrants as a whole, in the magnitude of 13% and 29% respectively, comparing to the 
pre-reform period. Our parametric specification shows that the introduction of the new 
nationality law reduces the gap between natives and immigrants in marginal propensity to 
save by 40% to 65%, depending on the measure of savings used.  
These findings suggest that much of the differences in terms of the savings 
behaviour between natives and immigrants are driven by the precautionary savings 
arising from the uncertainties about future income and legal status rather than cultural 
differences.  
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1. Introduction 
 
  Most of the research on migration has focused on the labour market performance 
of immigrants, hence ignoring their role in capital markets, particularly their savings 
behaviour. Although recent literature has filled this gap somewhat, further analysis is 
needed to systematically analyse the differences between levels of precautionary savings 
of natives and immigrants, especially since savings is an important determinant of the 
assimilation process in the host country. 
Recently several papers have contributed to the general topic of migrants’ savings 
behaviour. Galor and Stark (1990) and Dustmann (1997) consider the link between return 
intentions of migration and their savings behaviour. Using overlapping generations 
model, Galor and Stark show that the higher the probability of emigration from the host 
country higher is the level of savings. They argue that since migrants have high 
possibility of emigrating back to the source country, compared to natives, immigrants 
save more than natives.
1  
Dustmann (1997) endogenises migrants’ return-intention with their savings 
decision. More precisely, he links (precautionary) savings and return decisions with the 
level of uncertainty about future income stream. He shows that if labour markets in the 
home and host regions are correlated then immigrants will save more than the natives as 
they are subject to more income risk in the host country than are the natives. However, in 
the absence of correlation of economic conditions between the two countries, risk 
diversification favours immigrants as they are highly likely to emigrate back to their 
                                                 
1 Other arguments have also been explored for the difference in savings rate between natives and 
immigrants. There might be cultural or socioeconomic reasons which determine the level of savings, 
though this has been rejected by Shamsuddin and DeVortez (1998). Skill differences could also be 
responsible as it has an effect on the economic performance of immigrants (see Chiswick 1978 and Borjas 
1987) which could affect their savings behaviour.   3
home country in case of worsening labour market conditions in the host country. In such 
a circumstance, immigrants will save less compared to the natives. 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2002) use the 1979 Youth Cohort of the National 
Longitudinal Surveys (NLSY79) to compare the precautionary savings and wealth 
patterns of immigrants and natives. They find that immigrants on average accumulate less 
wealth, i.e., carry out lower precautionary savings in the host country, compared to 
natives. This finding is consistent with earlier results of Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994) 
for Canada, Merkle and Zimmermann (1993) for Germany and also partially support the 
theoretical results of Dustmann (1997). 
In a related paper, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) analyse the motives for 
remittances by the migrants. They argue that remittances are transferred to the home 
country for multiple reasons: to help family members (altruism), to purchase family-
provided insurance (informal agreement for reciprocal help in case of economic hardship 
faced by the migrant) and self-insurance (precautionary savings). They call the latter two 
the “insurance” motive and test this by correlating host variables with flows of 
remittances. More precisely, they determine the correlation between risk and uncertainty 
level in the host country with level of remittances, i.e., the level of insurance they 
purchase. 
Finally, a recent paper by Bauer and Sinning (2006) studies the savings behaviour 
of temporary and permanent migrants in Germany and compares that to those of the 
natives. Although their scope is a bit wider than ours, the main concept of their paper and 
ours is similar in nature. However, our paper differs from theirs in two significant ways.   4
Firstly, they ex ante impose a decision rule regarding the type of migration, 
temporary or permanent, whereas we follow Dustmann (1997) by making the decision 
process endogenous in nature. A large number of individuals initially migrate with a 
different motive but change their mind once they arrive, and spend time, in the host 
country. Therefore making the migration decision endogenous is crucial to this type of 
analysis. 
Secondly, and in relation to the above point, we explicitly introduce uncertainty to 
study the savings behaviour of natives and immigrants. Within this framework then, there 
are two different scenarios. On the one hand it could be argued that immigrants save 
more than the natives as there is a higher level of uncertainty regarding migrant’s 
employment status (because perhaps of their skill level or residency status in the country) 
and thus there is higher risk of lower earnings in the future. Under this condition, 
immigrants are likely to save more than the natives. However, on the other hand, 
immigrants have the option to diversify risk by taking employment in their home country 
when conditions in the host country get worse. In this case they are likely to have lower 
level of savings compared to the natives.  
In terms of modelling the approach discussed above, we believe that the two 
aspects of savings discussed in two separate papers by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
(2002, 2006) could be analysed within the same framework to make a proper comparison 
between natives and immigrants since for immigrants savings behaviour is related to the 
remittance behaviour as for them part of the savings takes place outside the host country. 
More precisely we assume agents to be uncertain about their future stream of income and   5
maximise their utility over 2 periods with two possible states of the world in period two: 
either “good” (high income, which is assumed in period 1) or “bad” (low income).  
Using the German Socio-Economic Panel data we find that, once remittances are 
taken into account, immigrants tend to save more than the natives. However, in order to 
capture the impact of uncertainty on the savings (including remittance) behaviour of 
immigrants, we exploit the natural experiment arising from a change in nationality law in 
Germany in 2000. We find that the easing of the requirements for naturalization has 
caused significant reductions of savings and remittances for immigrants as a whole, 
which is consistent with our risk story. In other words, with a fall in the uncertainty level 
in the host country a migrant tends to behave more like a native which shows a positive 
trend towards assimilation. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines a brief theoretical 
model to set out the foundation for the estimations of the model. Section 3 discusses the 
data while section 4 presents the empirical analysis. The last section concludes the paper. 
     
2. A Brief Theoretical Model 
Following Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), we consider a two-period model 
in which the households know with certainty their income in the first period but there is 
uncertainty about the income in the second period which consists of a “good” state or a 
“bad” state. More precisely, income level in the second period, in the good state, is Y
L 
(low) with probability µ and Y
H (high), in the bad state, with probability (1-µ). In the first 
period the income level is assumed to be Y
H with certainty.    6
   Households derive their utility from consumption C1 in the first period and a 
discounted consumption level C2 in the second period.  
 
12 ln ln UC C δ =+          ( 1 )  
 
where δ is the discount factor. 
 
As in the simple two-period model, consumption in the first period is constrained 
by the savings made in that period for use in the second period, 
 
1
H CY S ≤−           ( 2 )  
 
In period 2, the household is faced with two possibilities. Either the good state will 
prevail with probability (1-µ) or the household will face the bad state with probability µ, 
then 
  () ( ) ( ) 2 11 1
LH CY S r Y S r µµ   ≤+ + + − + +        (3) 
where r is the interest rate.  
  The households choose the level of savings to maximise their utility subject to the 
two constraints. The first order condition for this maximisation problem gives us the 
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Our objective in this paper is to analyse the role of uncertainty on the savings 
behaviour of households. In particular we want to determine whether non-natives save   7
more or less as a precautionary motive compared to the natives. A priori we have two 
competing views on migrants’ savings behaviour. One, as mentioned earlier, is that 
migrants are subject to more income risk in the host country than are the natives therefore 
will tend to save more. However, on the other hand migrants are more likely to diversify 
risk as they could always emigrate back to their home country if economic conditions in 
the host country were unfavourable. In this case migrants are likely to save less than the 
natives. The two conditions in our framework could be shown below.  
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This result suggests that an increase in the probability of the poor state increases the 
savings rate. This is consistent with the permanent income hypothesis as it states that an 
individual will decrease consumption in the good state (in the first period) and will 
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; a very small discount rate is required to trigger savings in the presence of high 









 which means a higher dispersion between the good and bad state results 
in higher level of savings.  This is then consistent with consumption smoothing as well as 
with our story of saving for the future in the presence of uncertainty about the state of the 
world in the second period. In the rest of the paper we conduct an empirical analysis of 
this setup. More precisely, we will determine the effect of uncertainty on the savings 
behaviour of immigrants (and compare it to that of natives) due to a change in their legal 
(residency) status in Germany.  
 
3. Data 
  We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) data which is a 
representative micro data on individuals and families in Germany collected annually 
since 1984. The sample consists of households with a head aged between 16 and 65 
during 1998-2005 inclusive, i.e. waves 15 through 22
2. Since one of the main focus 
points, as mentioned in the Introduction, is the analysis of the impact of new nationality 
law (change in the legal residency status of immigrants) which came into effect in 
January 2000 (see Appendix A), we exclude the “Innovation Sample” and the “High 
Income Sample”, both of which were added to the main sample after 2000. As only 1% 
of all immigrants live in East Germany at any time, we also drop East Germany from our 
sample. 
                                                 
2 2005 is the latest year available. The year 1998 was chosen as the beginning of the sample period because 
this enables the inclusion of both the “Immigrants Sample” starting in 1994/95 and the “Refreshment 
Sample” starting in 1998. 
   9
We distinguish between natives and immigrants according to the country of birth 
and nationality. For the purpose of our analysis, a native (German) is defined as someone 
who was born in Germany and holds German citizenship
3. In contrast, an immigrant 
(non-native) is someone who was not born in Germany, regardless of nationality. Within 
the group of immigrants, we can further differentiate between naturalized immigrants and 
foreigners according to the current nationality
4. Our final sample consists of 5551 distinct 
households, of which 1297 are non-natives. The median spells are 7 waves for natives 
and 6 for immigrants. 
The literature suggests that nationality and country of origin matter for people’s 
saving and remittance behaviour. In particular, these factors are expected to affect 
people’s precautionary savings. For instance, immigrants might have a higher marginal 
propensity to save (MPS) compared to the natives because they face higher 
employment/income uncertainties for various reasons, such as restrictions imposed by the 
legal and welfare system or discrimination in the labour market. On the other hand, an 
alternative explanation to differential in the MPS is the unobserved heterogeneity (for 
“culture effects”, see e.g. Carroll, Rhee and Rhee 1994) across natives and immigrants. 
The discrimination between these two competing hypotheses is not only of academic 
interest, it also carries important policy implications: if differences in preferences or 
tastes (or culture in general) are responsible for the variation in the marginal propensity to 
save across natives and immigrants, then one would expect to see a convergence in the 
savings and consumption behaviour through the process of assimilation which is long-
                                                 
3 GSOEP does not ask respondents about the country of births of their parents. 
4 There are 183 distinct individuals who were born in Germany but do not have German citizenship in our 
sample. These are presumably second-generation immigrants who form an interesting group in its own 
right. However, we feel that the sample size is too small to generate estimates with any precision and 
therefore decide to leave them out for the current paper.   10
term in nature. In contrast, if the difference in MPS across natives and immigrants is 
largely driven by differentials in uncertainties (i.e. precautionary savings motive), then 
legal reforms that reduce uncertainties might lead to sizeable changes in behaviour over 
the short-term. Therefore, the real challenge from an econometric point of view is to find 
an exogenous variation that will allow us to disentangle the effect of unobservables from 
that of different degrees of uncertainties faced by these two distinct groups.  
The recent reform of the nationality law in Germany offers us such a natural 
experiment. The 2000 citizenship legislation replaced the previous one which was solely 
based on the principle of descent (jus anguinis), dating back to the imperial period of 
1913, with the introduction of the country of birth (jus soli) principle in the citizenship 
law and the easing of the requirements for naturalization. This reform was only made 
possible after the Red-Green coalition led by Gerhard Schröder came to power in 1998, 
and therefore was largely unanticipated at the time
5. The change was also radical. For 
instance, the qualifying period was reduced from a minimum of 15 years to 8 years. 
Figure 1 shows that the proportion of non-natives acquiring German citizenship has 
steadily increased by more than a quarter, from 33% to 42%, over our sample period. 






                                                 
5 This implies that the choice of 1998 as the start of our sample period should work against us in finding a 
significant impact of the law change if anything.   11
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The outcome variable we focus on in this paper is “savings”. Three alternative 
measures are used throughout the paper, ranging from the narrowest to the broadest: 
1)  saving0: usual amount of money left over at the end of the month that the 
household can save for larger purchases, emergency expenses or to acquire 
wealth; 
2)  saving1 (saving0 + loan repayments): this also includes the amount of income 
for paying back loans which the household took out for major purchases of 
other expenses;   12
3)  saving2 (saving1 + remittances): this adds further payments or support by all 
household members to parents, children, (ex) spouse, and other persons related 
(or not) who live abroad. To the extent that all remittances are “insurance” 
related, this definition is fully justified. However, if parts of the remittances 
are motivated by altruism, then this definition might be regarded as an upper 
bound.  
 
   Figure 2 shows the mean levels of savings, loan repayments and remittances over 
time by legal status. It is obvious that natives save more on average than immigrants. 
This is not surprising as we do not control for any other factors, the most important of 
which is the household income. What is really striking is change in savings behaviour 
among immigrants that seems to take place around 2002-2003. Comparing to natives who 
have demonstrated remarkable stability over the sample period (with perhaps the 
exception of loan repayments which trended upwards), both savings and remittances have 
experienced a dramatic drop while loan repayments have increased post 2002 for the 
subsample of immigrants. 
   13




































Table 1 gives the summary statistics of the key variables for natives and 
immigrants separately. As we have mentioned before, almost 40% of immigrants in our 
sample period do not have German nationality, hence are classified as foreigners. Natives 
save €222 per month on average, more than 50% higher than the mean savings by 
immigrants. This “savings gap” is reduced to less than 30% if we consider loan 
repayments as savings. Once we take remittances into account, the gap is further reduced 
to less than 15%.   14
Although theoretically saving can be negative, it is often reported as a variable 
left-censored at zero in household surveys such as the GSOEP. Policymakers are 
interested in finding out the number and share of savers as well as the level of savings. So 
we also report the percentage of savers by different definitions in Table 1. It turns out that 
natives not only save more on average, but are also more likely to have positive savings. 
Over 60% of natives save on a regular basis, a figure which is about 35% higher than the 
45% for immigrants. However, as with the levels of savings, this gap in headcounts is 
also significantly reduced when we move to broader definition of savings. For instance, 
once we take into account both loan repayments and remittances, this gap is reduced to 
less than 10%. 
Comparing to natives, immigrant heads of households are slightly older (45.2 vs 
43.5 years old) and much less likely to be female (25.1% vs 37.8%). They receive 1.4 
years less schooling but are more likely to be married. Over a quarter of immigrants are 
of Turkish origin while about one in six immigrants is from former Yugoslavia. They are 
also less likely to be in work, and more than twice as likely to be unemployed (omitted 
category being inactivity) and more likely to be receiving social assistance. They are only 
half as likely to own their houses and apartments. Finally, immigrant families also tend to 
be larger and have more dependent children.   
To sum up, immigrants seem to fare worse in terms of virtually all socio-
economic indicators comparing to natives. However, this is not surprising given their 
relatively more disadvantaged background and the constraints imposed by their legal 
status. 
   15
 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 Natives  Immigrants 
Foreigner -  0.626 
Saving0 (€/month)  222.2  145.6 
Prop. with positive saving0 (%)  60.8  45.2% 
Saving1 (€/month)  308.5  238.5 
Prop. with positive saving1(%)  71.9  60.9 
Saving2 (€/month)  311.8  271.7 
Prop. with positive saving2(%)  72.2  65.8 
Age 43.5  45.2 
Female (%)  37.8  25.1 
Married (%)  57.7  75.5 
Years of Education  12.2  10.8 
Turkish (%)  -  26.9 
Former Yugoslavia (%)  -  15.5 
Employed (%)  75.8  68.9 
Unemployed (%)  4.5  11.3 
Receiving Social Assistance (%)  2.7  4.8 
Own House (%)  46.6  24.0 
Household size  2.56  3.15 
Number of children under 16  0.87  1.16 
Obs (person-waves)  23893  6945 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Simple Difference-in-differences Estimates without Controls 
  
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that it is perhaps no coincidence that immigrants in 
Germany decrease their levels of savings and remittances while increasing loan 
repayments (hence increasing consumption of durable goods) as Germany is undergoing 
a landmark reform of its immigration law. This is consistent with our theoretical model as 
the precautionary savings motive arising from the uncertainties, here due to their legal 
status, will be much weakened for immigrants as a result of the reform.    16
Table 2 presents simple difference-in-differences estimates without any further 
controls. The natives are used as controls while immigrants form the treatment group. We 
simply split the sample into two halves, with pre-treatment years defined as 1998-2001 
inclusive
6.   
  While natives, as expected, have significantly higher net income than immigrants 
on average, both natives and immigrants have experienced a 10.5% increase in household 
net income over the sample period. However the similarity ends when it comes to 
savings. It turns out that there is virtually no change in savings, loan repayments or 
remittances over the sample period for natives.
7 In contrast, savings and remittances go 
down while loan repayments go up for immigrants. The patterns are consistent with the 
figures in the previous section and the changes are all statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
  However, the difference-in-differences estimates are only statistically significant 
for savings and remittances. This suggests the introduction of the new citizenship law in 
2000 causes a statistically significant decrease in both savings and remittances relative to 
what it would have been in the absence of the reform. The decreases are also 
economically significant, at €20/month for savings and €11/month for remittances 
respectively. This corresponds to a 13% drop in savings and a remarkable 29% decrease 
in remittances compared to the base period. On the other hand, there appears to be no 
effect on loan repayments or adjustment household net income. These results are 
                                                 
6 Assigning 2000 and 2001 to the pre-treatment years allows for lags in the naturalization process (often 
taking more than 1 year) as well as doubling the sample size. On the other hand, immigrants’ behaviour 
might have already changed during this transition period due to expectations. 
7 Our sample of “natives” (recall they were born in Germany and are currently German nationals) 
inevitably includes a very small number of second-generation immigrants. It should not be surprising that a 
very small percentage of natives do report positive remittances. If anything, this measurement problem will 
work against us in finding statistically significant effects.   17
consistent with the view that the relaxation of immigration control in general and the 
easing of the requirements for naturalization in particular have significantly weakened 
precautionary savings for immigrants. In other words, a change in the legal status in 
favour of the immigrants reduces the level of uncertainty which in turn changes their 
savings behaviour.  
 
 
Table 2: Simple Difference-in-differences Estimates Without Controls 










































































Observations 12,639  11,254    3,866  3,079    





4.2 Difference-in-differences Estimates with Controls 
  
The difference-in-differences estimates presented in Table 2 do not control for 
individual and household characteristics. Table 3 shows difference-in-differences 
estimates with a full set of controls for age, gender, education, labour market status, 
benefit status, house ownership, ethnic origin, and number of people and dependent 
children in the household. It is clear that adding all these controls do not change the   18
results in Table 2 at all. If anything, the size of reductions of savings is now even higher, 
at €30/month. 
Table 3: Difference-in-differences Estimates with Controls 












































































































































Obs  (person-waves)  29856 29856 29856 29856 
Adj-R
2  0.099 0.017 0.055 0.333 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Bold difference estimates indicate statistical significance at the 5% 
level. 
   19
4.3 Parametric Estimation  
  It is worth noting that Table 3 does not control for variations in adjusted 
household net incomes in the estimation of the savings and remittances equations. 
Economists as well as policymakers are not only interested in (changes in) the absolute 
levels of savings and remittances, but also in the (changes in) the relative levels of 
savings, often measured as a share of net income. In particular, a measure of key 
importance is the marginal propensity to save (MPS), which refers to the increase in 
saving that results from a marginal increase in income. 
  Table 4 shows the random-effect Tobit estimates for the 3 alternative definitions 
of savings. In the following we will just focus on the change in the MPS differential 
between natives and immigrants arising from the introduction of the new citizenship law. 
The MPS for natives pre 2002 is in the range of 17.9% to 19.3% depending on which 
measure is used. The MPS for immigrants is almost 40% (around 7 percentage points) 
higher across all measures of savings in the base period, consistent with a much stronger 
motive for precautionary savings. There is a general decrease in MPS in the magnitude of 
2 percentage points across both subsamples post 2002. However, the MPS for immigrants 
as a whole has suffered an additional large and statistically significant drop, in the range 
of 2.8 to 4.8 percentage points. Indeed, this implies that the MPS gap in favour of 
immigrants pre-reform was closed by at least 40% if the narrowest definition of savings 
is used. When loan repayments and remittances are treated as savings, the gap could be 
reduced by as much as 65%.   20
Table 4: Random-Effect TOBIT Estimates with Alternative Savings Measures 
  Saving0 Saving1 Saving2 






























































































































Obs (person-waves)  29,856  29,856  29,856 
Rho 0.486  0.373  0.379 
Log  likelihood  -132898.13 -161415.85 -164367.81 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Bold cases indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. Saving1 
include loan repayments while saving2 include both loan repayments and remittances.   21
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
  We have carried out various robustness checks (not reported to save space) to 
make sure our findings are not sensitive with respect to functional forms (e.g. OLS vs 
TOBIT) or the treatment of the transition years. In the following we will focus on the 
validity of the natural experiment and test whether the causal effect indicated by the 
difference-in-difference model might be due to some remaining heterogeneity among 
immigrants. We simply split the immigrant sample into naturalized immigrants and 
foreigners according to their pre-reform citizenship status and repeat the difference-in-
differences exercises using the same control group of natives. If the nationality law which 
was introduced in 2000 was found to affect savings and remittances behaviour for 
immigrants who had already acquired German citizenship by 1999, then the causal 
effects we have found in the previous sections will be questionable. 
  Table 5A shows that the 2000 reform has had no effect whatsoever on immigrants 
who had already been naturalized by the time of the reform. In contrast, Table 5B shows 
that our main findings hold when we compare the subsample of foreigners who did not 
have German citizenships by the time the law was changed to the same control group of 
natives, although the difference-in-difference estimate for savings was only statistically 
significant at the 25% level
8. 
  This exercise clearly demonstrates that the causal effect we have identified is not 
driven by some remaining heterogeneity between naturalized immigrants and foreigners 
and hence lends strong support to the validity of natural experiment. 
                                                 
8 This might be due to a slight attrition bias introduced through the requirement that all immigrants must 
have their pre-reform legal status known.   22
 
Table 5A: Simple Difference-in-differences Estimates Without Controls, Natives vs 
Naturalized Immigrants 










































































Observations 12,639  11,254    1,256  909    






Table 5B: Simple Difference-in-differences Estimates Without Controls, Natives vs 
Foreigners 










































































Observations 12,639  11,254    2,525  1,758    
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper analysed the savings behaviour of natives and immigrants in Germany 
using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSEOP) data. We found that savings reported 
by natives are 50% higher than that by immigrants on average, and natives are 35% more 
likely to have positive savings than immigrants. However, the savings gap is largely 
reduced once we take loan repayments and remittances into account. Moreover, 
controlling for a full set of individual and family characteristics, we found that the 
marginal propensity to save for immigrants is actually about 40% higher than natives. 
We then moved on to estimate the importance of precautionary savings using a 
natural experiment arising from a change in the nationality law in Germany in 2000. 
Using a difference-in-differences approach, we found that the easing of the requirements 
for naturalization has caused significant reductions of savings and remittances for 
immigrants as a whole, in the magnitude of 13% and 29% respectively, comparing to the 
pre-reform period. On the other hand, the change in legislation does not affect the 
differential between natives and immigrants in loan repayments or total net income. 
These results are also robust to adding controls for individual and household 
characteristics. 
Our parametric specification also suggests that the introduction of the new 
nationality law reduces the gap between natives and immigrants in marginal propensity to 
save by 40% to 65%, depending on the measure of savings used.  
Our results are robust with respect to a number of sensitivity checks. In particular, 
we have shown that the 2000 reform has had no effect on immigrants who had already 
acquired German citizenship by the time the law was introduced. This exercise clearly   24
demonstrates that the causal effect we have identified is not driven by some remaining 
heterogeneity between naturalized immigrants and foreigners and hence lends strong 
support to the validity of natural experiment. Put together, our findings suggest that much 
of the differences in terms of the savings behaviour between natives and immigrants are 
driven by the precautionary savings arising from the uncertainties about future income 
and legal status rather than cultural differences.     25
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